Churchill, Chamberlain and Appeasement
Was Churchill correct when he claimed the Second World War could easily have been prevented if Chamberlain had not appeased Hitler? How far did Churchill and Chamberlain differ on defence and foreign policy? To what extent was Chamberlain responsible for military defeats in 1940? In this new account of appeasement, G. C. Peden addresses these questions and provides a comparative analysis of Chamberlain and Churchill's views on foreign policy and strategic priorities, explores what deterrence and appeasement meant in the military, economic and political context of the 1930s and where Chamberlain and Churchill agreed and disagreed on how best to deter Germany. Beginning in 1931 when Chamberlain became Chancellor of the Exchequer, this book explores the evolution of British policy towards Germany through to the Munich Agreement and its aftermath within the context of Britain's power to influence international affairs in the 1930s and of contemporary intelligence.
- Compares Churchill and Chamberlain in relation to appeasement
- Enables reader to understand how historical actors' characters have influenced policy
- Aimed at academic scholars, students and general readers interested in the history of the Second World War, modern British history, international history, as well as to a wider readership interested in Churchill
Reviews & endorsements
‘A masterly analysis that takes a fresh approach to appeasement, based on the author's expert knowledge and understanding of both policies and personalities.' Gill Bennett, Former FCO Chief Historian
‘A rigorous and compelling new look at one of the most important episodes in twentieth-century British and European History.' Richard Toye, University of Exeter
'Chamberlain, the man with the umbrella, and Churchill, the man with the cigar, were both brand names by 1930 … Chamberlain’s dramatic flight to meet Hitler at Munich in September 1938 meant that the word ‘appeasement’ was associated with him as clearly as if it had been tattooed on his forehead. Churchill's opposition to the Munich Agreement was equally dramatic … But G. C. Peden suggests that the contract between the two was less black-and-white than it first appears.' Richard Vinen, Literary Review
‘This well-researched and scholarly book brings together Peden’s earlier specialities and publications with fresh perspectives and work … A book to enjoy as well as to consider.’ Jeremy Black, Journal of European Studies
‘Peden’s book will be the definitive history of the Churchill-Chamberlain relationship for some time to come.’ Peter Neville, Diplomacy & Statecraft
‘Peden’s contribution to the historiography is to juxtapose a close reading of the diplomatic sources with analysis of the structural strengths and weaknesses of the British economy as they related to rearmament. The result is not a revolutionary reinterpretation, but rather a more nuanced reading of what could realistically have been accomplished in the lead-up to September 1939 … Recommended.’ F. Krome, Choice
‘Accessible and engaging.’ David M. Valladares, History
‘[The book gives] a thorough and often convincing picture of what is known and alerts the reader to multiple differing viewpoints. A willingness to address counterfactuals - and where they may lead - makes this compelling history.’ David C. Isby, strategypage.com
‘Peden evidently has an encyclopaedic understanding of the secondary literature on appeasement, which he weaves seamlessly through the analysis, challenging some historical interpretations and reinforcing others … although it is not the first counterfactual study of this period, Peden’s book is certainly a contender for its most detailed.’ William D. James, Journal of Strategic Studies
Product details
June 2025Paperback
9781009201964
418 pages
229 × 152 × 22 mm
0.604kg
Available
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- 1. Churchill, Chamberlain and historians
- 2. Personalities and policymaking
- 3. Britain and the balance of power
- 4. The darkening scene
- 5. The Ethiopian and Rhineland crises
- 6. Chamberlain takes charge
- 7. From the Anschluss to Munich
- 8. From Munich to Prague
- 9. Deterrence by guarantee
- 10. The test of war
- 11. Counterfactuals and conclusions.