Choosing Defeat
A truly unique all-embracing narrative of the American war in Afghanistan from the own words of its architects. Choosing Defeat takes an unparalleled inside look at America's longest war, pulling back the curtain on the inner deliberations behind the scenes. The author combines his own extensive experience in the Army, the CIA, and the White House, with interviews from policymakers within the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, to produce a groundbreaking study of how American leaders make wartime decisions. Transporting you inside the White House Situation Room, every key strategic debate over twenty years – from the immediate aftermath of 9/11, to Obama's surge and withdrawal, to Trump's negotiations with the Taliban, and Biden's final pullout is carefully reconstructed. Paul D. Miller identifies issues in US leadership, governance, military strategy, and policymaking that extend beyond the war in Afghanistan and highlight the existence of deeper problems in American foreign policy.
- Paul D. Miller is among the foremost experts in the world on the Afghanistan conflict following his career as a soldier, CIA officer, and senior NSC staffer under Presidents Bush and Obama.
- Personal insights from generals, ambassadors, and cabinet members in the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations express firsthand what policymakers believed and why they made the choices they did.
- Explores how and why the war ended the way it did, and what lessons can be salvaged in order to help avoid similar mistakes in the future.
Reviews & endorsements
'This is a remarkable and important book - erudite and detailed, yet pithy and provocative. As a soldier, intelligence analyst, policymaker, professor, and scholar, Paul D. Miller has certainly earned his right to write this book and offer his take on the history of America's Afghanistan experience. More, he has helped us understand what went so badly wrong there, even though Americans like him who served can take some solace that the war helped prevent another 9/11 despite its ultimate failure to achieve larger objectives.' Michael O'Hanlon, Phil Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy, the Brookings Institution, and author of To Dare Mighty Things: U.S. Defense Strategy Since the Revolution
'Paul D. Miller's detailed accounting of how the US lost the war in Afghanistan is an important, sobering analysis that every new policymaker should read.' Kori Schake, Director for Foreign and Defense Policy, American Enterprise Institute
'Paul D. Miller argues that the problem in Afghanistan was not too much reliance on counterinsurgency and nation-building, but too little - and flawed, inconsistent, rushed implementation where they were undertaken at all. His perceptive, penetrating analysis is essential reading for anyone interested not just in Afghanistan but in civil warfare and stabilization generally.' Stephen Biddle, Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Product details
October 2025Hardback
9781009614375
545 pages
235 × 163 × 35 mm
0.91kg
Not yet published - available from September 2025
Table of Contents
- 1. Myths and mysteries of war in Afghanistan
- 2. 2001: victory
- 3. 2002–2003: neglect
- 4. 2003–2005: refocus
- 5. 2006: insurgency
- 6. 2007–2008: counterinsurgency
- 7. 2009: false start
- 8. 2009: the hinge
- 9. 2010–2011: surge
- 10. 2010–2014: Negotiations
- 11. 2012–2014: transition
- 12. 2015–2016: Obama's forever war
- 13. 2017–2018: Trump's forever war
- 14. 2018–2020: Doha
- 15. 2021: defeat
- 16. Why did we lose?